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In May 2008, as the country was beginning its democratic
transition, Nepali citizens elected a Constituent Assembly (CA) tasked
with drafting a federal constitution. Despite all of the major political
forces in Nepal being on record supporting federal structures, federalism
has proven the most contentious question surrounding the adoption of a
new constitution. Indeed, disagreement over the number of constituent
units of a federal Nepal was a central reason behind the four extensions
given to the original two year mandate of the CA. The fact that federalism
has been the most controversial issue in constitution-making in Nepal is
particularly meaningful considering the scope and importance of choices
facing the CA, whose members have had to decide, among other things,
on a system of government, a rights regime, and a judicial system.
Why is the basic design of the federal system proving so
problematic in Nepal? In the literature, the origins of federal systems are
typically located in elite pacts seeking to create common markets and
security arrangements or to provide autonomy to communities with a
historical homeland. Not only does neither situation apply very well to
Nepal, but the literature is mostly silent on what causes frictions in
negotiations over federalism beyond the behavior of maximizing selfinterested actors or the autonomist pursuit of a specific historical
community.
This paper will draw on historical institutionalism to account for
the paradox of the difficulty to agree on federalism in Nepal despite the
apparent unanimity between major political parties that federalism is
necessary to manage the country’s diversity (close to 100 groups are
officially recognized) in a democratic regime. It develops three
complementary explanations for addressing this paradox.
First, the paper explains that consensus on federalism hides
lukewarm support, if not a reluctance, by key actors to build a federal
system. Federalism was written into the interim constitution in 2007 when
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an uprising in the South of the country (Madhesh) required political
guarantees that territorial autonomy would be part of the new framework.
Second, the paper suggests that while some political forces,
namely Madheshi parties and leaders of the country’s ethnic communities,
want federal structures based on ethnic identities, two of the three main
political parties (Nepali Congress, NC; Communist Party of Nepal-Unified
Marxist-Leninist, CPN-UML) have no history of opposing the state
through ethnic identity politics and little appetite for ‘ethnic federalism’
while the other, Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, UCPN-M,
publicly supports it because of its connection with the ethnic communities
but is internally divided over the wisdom of institutionalizing ethnicity
through federalism. Hence, disagreement over the extent to which the
country’s various ethnic identities should be represented in its federal
structures makes it difficult to come to an agreement on federalism.
Third, the paper shows that distinct, and sometimes antagonistic,
ideas have been featured in the debate over federalism. More specifically,
the idea of self-determination, readily associated with federalism by
Madheshi parties and leaders of ethnic communities, coexists uneasily
with political ideas such as ‘national unity’, ‘sovereignty,’ and
‘development’ that suggest a different, non-ethnically-based, federal
structuring. Federalism has different meanings for different people in
Nepal, which means that translating the concept into concrete structures,
even a basic federal map, falls victim to underlying tensions.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section poses the
question of federalism in Nepal. It explains how federalism came to be
part of the constitution-making process and how the various parties
support different federal maps of the country, with the key issue being the
extent to which the constituent units will represent ethnic identities. This
section also queries the literature for insight into the question of the
origins of federalism. Facing serious limitations as to the usefulness of this
literature in explaining the difficulty in agreeing on a federal map in
Nepal, I discuss how historical institutionalism presents great potential for
effectively tackling this question.
In the second section, I explain how the federal specification
brought to the interim constitution in 2007 was the contingent product of
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timely pressures from the Madhesh. As a result, the apparent consensus on
federalism is superficial. In the third section, I argue that there is, amongst
Nepal’s main political parties, much opposition to the notion of ‘ethnic
federalism’, that is, against any federal structuring that would have
constituent units become the political communities for specific ethnic
groups. In the fourth section, I explain how tensions between different
political ideas surrounding federalism further complicate agreement on
federal structures. In the conclusion, I attempt to draw some implications
of Nepal’s experience for theorizing the origins of federalism.
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